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OFF-LABEL DRUG PROMOTION IS
LOST IN TRANSLATION:
A PRESCRIPTION FOR A PUBLIC
HEALTH APPROACH TO
REGULATING THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY'S
RIGHT TO MARKET AND SELL ITS
PRODUCTS
MARIESTELA BUHAY*
INTRODUCTION
Constitutional adjudication regarding pharmaceutical manufacturers' First
Amendment right to market and promote their products for off-label use is hardly a
picture of clarity. Off-label use, the use of a drug or medical device for a condition
for which the drug or device is not approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA),' is itself controversial, but whether pharmaceutical companies can promote
such use creates unique tensions.2 Under its jurisdictional authority, the FDA
manages and monitors manufacturers' product marketing; to promote the FDA-
approved use of a product consistent with its label, manufacturers commonly
advertise, distribute various forms of promotional material in print, promote
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1. Off-label promotion practices has not been formally defined by statute but case law has
provided some direction. The trial court in Washington Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 28 n. I
(D.D.C. 1995), provided a workable definition to what off-label promotion may entail. According to the
court, off-label promotion is triggered when a drug has been encouraged to be administered for a
condition, dosage, and/or population that has not been tested and approved by the FDA. Id.
2. See, e.g., Joseph Leghorn et al., The First Amendment and FDA Restrictions on Off-Label Uses:
The Call for a New Approach, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391 (2008) (discussing the need for a better
approach in acknowledging new advancements in care and treatment of individual patients while still
maintaining the safety of the public's health intact).
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products during medical education seminars, and market uses of its products
through their sales representatives. 3  The FDA, however, does restrict
manufacturers' ability to promote off-label uses of their products.4 On the one
hand, FDA's restrictions on a pharmaceutical manufacturer's commercial practice
of labeling and promoting its products for off-label use appear to serve a legitimate
public health goal.5 On the other hand, these regulations arguably affect the
pharmaceutical company's rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment. 6 Despite this back-and-forth dynamic between the FDA's attempts to
assure the safety and efficacy of therapeutic products and the pharmaceutical
industry's concern that the agency's seemingly paternalistic measures are trampling
on their First Amendment rights, at least one United States federal court has
determined that the FDA's interest in safeguarding the public health outweighs a
pharmaceutical sales representative's constitutional right to freedom of speech
when that sales representative promotes several off-label uses of a drug to a
physician.7 The decision in United States v. Caronia,8 coupled with the FDA's
recent final guidance on the permissibility of disseminating information about off-
label uses in printed format and at medical education programs, 9 suggest that there
is a legitimate focus by the FDA in regulating the promotion of off-label use.
Over the past decade, apprehension has escalated among government
policymakers, patient advocates, and leaders in academic medicine about the
influence of the drug and medical device industry on medical research, specialized
medical education classes, and the industry practice of promoting off-label
prescription use.'0 The FDA at present imposes several restrictions on drug and
3. Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened Professional and
Government Oversight, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 476,477 (2009).
4. Id.
5. Promotion of Unapproved Drugs and Medical Devices: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of William B. Shultz, Deputy Comm'r for Policy,
Food & Drug Admin.).
6. Dresser & Frader, supra note 3, at 478.
7. United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 401-02 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
8. Id.
9. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE
PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED
MEDICAL DEVICES (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/98fr/fda-2008-d-0053-
gdl.pdf [hereinafter FDA GOOD REPRINT GUIDANCE] (discussing suggestions to the drug and medical
device companies on appropriate off-label promotional practices).
10. See, e.g., ASS'N AM. MED. COLLS., INDUSTRY FUNDING OF MEDICAL EDUCATION: REPORT OF
AN AAMC TASK FORCE 1-10 (2008), available at https:/services.aamc.org/publications/showfile.cfm?
file=version 114.pdf&prd-id=232&prv_id=281&pdf id=114 (noting the heavy presence of
pharmaceutical industry influence within the medical education context via sponsored educational
events, gifts, distribution of prescription drug samples directly to health care practitioners, and other
benefits); Niteesh K. Choudhry et al., Relationships Between Authors of Clinical Practice Guidelines
and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 287 JAMA 612 (2002) (conducting a study clinicians and their
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device manufacturers from promoting unapproved uses of drugs and devices, even
though the promotional information may very well be factually supported."
Although under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 12 the current federal
policy authorizes drug manufacturers to market and label drugs only for uses that
have received approval from the FDA, 13 physicians are free to issue off-label
prescriptions to a patient for treatment of a medical condition for which the drug
has not undergone standardized safety and efficacy testing.1 4 However, not only
have courts recurrently held that numerous off-label drug uses can be appropriate
modes of therapy, 5 FDA has frequently recognized that under certain medical
circumstances, some off-label drug uses are an appropriate way to medically treat a
patient.' 6 This alarmingly regular practice of doctors prescribing off-label uses of
drugs has given rise to drug companies advertising to doctors in order to encourage
prescriptions for off-label uses of drugs, even after some companies have incurred
criminal and civil liabilities for doing so. 7 Unlike the medicines prescribed for
FDA-approved treatments, an argument can be made that the practice of promoting
off-label use adversely affects the public's health because no safeguards are in
place to protect the patient from unsafe or ineffective medical care. Regulatory
oversight rather than self-regulation by drug companies should set the standard in
off-label drug promotion to physicians. A modification of the current approaches to
off-label promotion is immediately needed.
While the pharmaceutical industry claims that promotion of off-label use is, at
its core, commercial speech in the food and drug law context and thus entitled to
possible influence by their colleagues' relationships with pharmaceutical companies); Catherine D.
DeAngelis & Phil B. Fontanarosa, Impugning the Integrity of Medical Science: The Adverse Effects of
Industry Influence, 299 JAMA 1833 (2008) (discussing instances of pharmaceutical and medical device
companies' profound influence on the medical profession and to their scientific research studies and
publications); Robert Steinbrook, Financial Support of Continuing Medical Education, 299 JAMA 1060
(2008) (critiquing medical education and its dependence on financial support from pharmaceutical and
medical device companies).
II. Richard C. Ausness, "There's Danger Here, Cherie!" Liability for the Promotion and
Marketing of Drugs and Medical Devices for Off-Label Uses, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 1253, 1259-62 (2008).
12. FDA's ability to prohibit such dissemination of drug use information traces back to when
Congress empowered FDA, by the passage of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), to regulate
prescription drug labels. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2006)). At the time the FDCA was enacted in
1938, it established the requirements of drugs needing adequate labeling to promote and assure safe
usage by the public. Id.
13. James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking
Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 76 (1998).
14. Id. at 76, 78-79.
15. See, e.g., Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1994); Upjohn Co. v. MacMurdo, 562 So.
2d 680, 683 (Fla. 1990)
16. Beck & Azari, supra note 13, at 79.
17. See infra Part I.B.
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First Amendment protection afforded to commercial speech in general, 8 this
constitutional protection is not an absolute right uniformly granted to commercial
entities.' 9 Although off-label promotion may violate the FDCA, there is currently
no consensus on the extent to which the FDA can regulate commercial promotional
truthful messages between a pharmaceutical manufacturer and a licensed doctor.2 °
Because no definitive line of law or regulation has been established within this
realm of government restriction and commercial promotion and because off-label
prescribing by doctors is a widely accepted practice, sometimes even constituting
the standard of care in particular circumstances, 21 the pharmaceutical industry has
continued to aggressively assert its First Amendment rights to promote its products
in an attempt to lessen regulatory interference by FDA.22
How much, then, is the social cost of meeting FDA safety and effectiveness
standards prior to promotion of off-label uses of approved drugs, or prior to
dissemination of physician-reviewed journal articles for off-label uses? Just how
much regulatory oversight to administer to off-label promotion, however, is a
question over which proponents of regulatory review of off-label promotion and the
pharmaceutical industry sharply disagree. 3 The direction in which off-label
promotion has been heading should not be ignored.24 Whether the pharmaceutical
companies are promoting products in a truthful manner or distributing reprints of
peer-reviewed medical journal articles that are scientifically sound has been
recently shown to be suspect.25 While off-label marketing efforts are commercial in
18. See Comments of Pfizer, Inc., FDA Dkt. No. 02N-0209, at 8-9, 11-12, 165 (Sept. 13, 2002),
available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/O2/Sep02/091602/80027f2d.pdf.
19. See Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding Awkward Alchemy--In the Off-Label Drug Context and Beyond:
Fully-Protected Independent Research Should Not Transmogrify into Mere Commercial Speech Just
Because Product Manufacturers Distribute It, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963 (1999) (examining the
comprehensive history of the changing definitions of commercial speech since the origination of the
commercial speech doctrine in the context of off-label research dissemination).
20. Mark Ratner & Trisha Gura, Off-Label or Off-Limits?, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 867, 873-
74 (2008).
21. Emily A. Largent et al., Going Off-Label Without Venturing Off-Course, 169 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNAL MED. 1745, 1745 (2009).
22. See, e.g., Gina Shaw, Is Off-Label Marketing a First Amendment Right? Allergen Asks in a
Lawsuit Against FDA Over Botulinum Promotion, 9 NEUROLOGY TODAY 20 (2009) (discussing
Allergen's, the manufacturer of Botulinum toxin type A (Botox) recent lawsuit claiming that the current
prohibition of off-label promotion violate its First Amendment right to share relevant information to
physicians on a new use of a drug).
23. Ratner & Gura, supra note 20, at 874-75.
24. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of Interest: A
Policy Proposal for Academic Medical Centers, 295 JAMA 429 (2006). According to one study, an
estimated ninety percent of the $21 billion marketing budget of the pharmaceutical industry has
reportedly been directed at physicians. Id. at 430.
25. Bruce M. Psaty & Wayne Ray, FDA Guidance on Off-Label Promotion and the State of the
Literature from Sponsors, 299 JAMA 1949, 1950 (2008). In leading up to these promotional efforts,
large amount of funds by the pharmaceutical industry have been shown to have been shuffled toward
marketing initiatives. In 2002, for example, the ten largest U.S. drug manufacturers spent thirty-one
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nature, they are nonetheless inextricably linked to patients consuming therapeutic
products that have not undergone efficacy studies.26
Evaluating questions relating to the government's prohibition against off-
label promotion in conjunction with freedom of commercial expression and what is
deemed as protected speech or a permissible form of regulatory policy requires
contextual analysis, especially in light of the recent ruling in Caronia and the
FDA's latest guidance on promotional materials used or distributed by
pharmaceutical manufacturers. This Comment seeks to emphasize the perspective
of the Caronia court's ruling and the impact it can provide on the current
pharmaceutical industry's practice of promoting their products to physicians for
off-label use. In the United States, off-label drug use is pervasive and given that
both its risks and benefits are comprehensively recognized by the medical
27community, the need to contextualize this as a public health dilemma is ripe. In
addressing the unremitting tension that exists between government regulation and
private sector commercialism with respect to off-label promotion, this Comment
will argue for a more balanced oversight of the pharmaceutical industry in three
parts.
Part I examines the existence of a public health initiative within the context of
off-label advertising.28 It evaluates the FDA's off-label use policy and its regulatory
approaches on the promotion of off-label uses by pharmaceutical manufacturers. In
Parts II and III, this Comment will turn to two recent developments: (1) the holding
of the Eastern District of New York in Caronia,2 9 and (2) the FDA's recent
guidance directed at the pharmaceutical industry's practice of distributing medical
journal articles and other scientific publications to physicians on unapproved new
uses of drugs.30 This Comment will conclude by underscoring the need to attain a
balance between consumer protection and the pharmaceutical industry's
constitutionally protected freedom to communicate about innovative features of its
products.3' Certainly this policy constricts the industry's right to freely engage in a
percent of revenues on marketing but only fourteen percent on research and development of their
products. Marcia Angell, Excess in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 171 CANADIAN MED. AS'N J. 1451,
1452 (2004).
26. David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES
OF INTERNAL MED. 1021 (2006). A recent study concluded that seventy-three percent of all off-label
uses fail to show sufficient evidence of efficacy, and that ninety-six percent of the most prevalent off-
label uses for psychiatric treatment lack efficacy findings. Id. at 1023.
27. Daniel B. Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Who Certifies Off-Label?, 27 REGULATION 60, 60-61
(2004).
28. See infra Part 1.
29. The court held that the FDA's interest in protecting the public health outweighed a
pharmaceutical sales representative's constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech despite the
fact that the practice of utilizing off-label use by physicians is not itself illegal. United States v. Caronia,
576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 401-02 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
30. See infra Part II.
31. See infra Part III.
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commercial market, but the engagement can proceed in a calculated, responsible
manner to better ensure the overall welfare of the patient population.
I. WHAT IS A PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM AND IS IT APPLICABLE TO OFF-LABEL
PRESCRIBING?
A. Public Health-Then and Now
The scope and nature of public health as a field has evolved into a broadly
and deeply encompassing discipline. The practice of public health emerged at the
turn of the twentieth century when state health departments began to regulate
communicable disease outbreaks, unsanitary or unsafe conditions in a
community,32 and occurrences of vaccine-preventable diseases, 33 with the aim of
improving and ensuring the public's health. But as community health boundaries
were established, new public health problems emerged and an urgent need to
respond became warranted by justifiable and appropriate government interventions,
oftentimes at the expense of individual liberties and interests, for the overall benefit
of the public health.34 Although the focus of public health measures initially began
with response to infectious diseases, unfolding public health threats led to an
expansion in numerous regulatory measures directed towards improvement of the
public health:35 legislative directives to minimize food-borne diseases,
36
government decrees to prevent and control chronic disease,37 policy enactments to
prevent and curb tobacco use 38 and governmental management in correcting and
controlling environmental health risks,39 to name a few.
With this as the backdrop to the development of public health activities and
its inextricable connection to law, the work and governmental efforts to organize in
order to minimize causes of illness to the health of a population paved the path
32. JAMES A. TOBEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: A MANUAL OF LAW FOR SANITARIANS 10-13 (1926).
33. James Colgrove & Ronald Beyer, Manifold Restraints: Liberty, Public Health, and the Legacy
ofJacobson v. Massachusetts, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 571, 572 (2005).
34. See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT Part II (2d ed.
2008).
35. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1988), reprinted in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND
ETHICS: A READER 37, 38 (Lawrence 0. Gostin ed., 2002) [hereinafter IOM REPORT]; see also INST. OF
MED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE 21 ST CENTURY (2003) (an updated report detailing
the current public health infrastructure and its evolving relationships with governmental public health
agencies, policymakers, the general population, and the health care delivery system).
36. Leslie Kux et al., Control of Foodborne Diseases, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 361-
84 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2007).
37. Angela K. McGowan et al., Prevention and Control of Chronic Disease, in LAW IN PUBLIC
HEALTH PRACTICE, supra note 36, at 402-26.
38. Richard A. Daynard et al., Prevention and Control of Diseases Associated with Tobacco Use
Through Law and Policy, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, supra note 36, at 427-51.
39. Daniel D. Stier et al., Environmental Health and Protection, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH
PRACTICE, supra note 36, at 478-505.
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toward a widening definition of public health. Lawrence 0. Gostin provides an
excellent definition of public health law and the complexities inherent within the
ever-developing scope of public health:
Public health law is the study of the legal powers and duties of the state,
in collaboration with its partners (e.g., health care, business, the
community, the media, and academe), to ensure the conditions for
people to be healthy (to identify, prevent, and ameliorate risks to health
in the population), and of the limitations on the power of the state to
constrain for the common good the autonomy, privacy, liberty,
proprietary, and other legally protected interests of individuals. The
prime objective of public health law is to pursue the highest possible
level of physical and mental health in the population, consistent with the
values of social justice.40
This definition directs awareness to the many circumstances that influence health
and wellness, underlining the vast dimensions of public health and legitimizes its
interest in not only economic, social, and political aspects but also medical care
factors that affect health and illness. The definition's premise, one that other
proponents of public health have also adopted,4' that society has an interest in the
health of its members indicates that assuring and improving health conditions is, in
essence, acting collectively for the public's own self-interest. Therefore, the claim
that improving, assuring, and protecting the well-being of others affords benefits to
all has developed into a core tenet of public health.42
Just as public health legislation and measures have taken the form of
mandatory reporting of infectious diseases, immunization requirements for children
prior to entry of school, fluoridating of community water systems, and
requirements for safety and efficacy in foods and drugs, off-label promotion
practices can be placed within the gamut of public health regulated activities. With
the growth of industrialized commerce and urban communities who need rapid
manufacturing of drugs for medical treatments, governmental intervention is
needed to provide basic safety protection and efficacy standards in consumer
consumption of these chemically potent medical products. Government has an
established authority for exercising oversight over retail food companies, sewage
40. GOSTIN, supra note 34, at 4.
41. Charles-Edward A. Winslow, The Untilled Field of Public Health, 2 MOD. MED. 183 (1920);
see generally Jean C. O'Conner et al., CONCURRENT SESSIONS: Closing Remarks: Conference
Synopsis and Observations, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHIcS 210, 214 (2002) (providing a summary of the
current status of public health and its inextricable connection to a broad range of health-laws).
42. In 1988, the Institute of Medicine defined the public health's objective as working towards
"fulfilling society's interest in assuring conditions in which people can be healthy." IOM REPORT, supra
note 35, at 38.
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and water systems, occupational health and safety conditions, consumer product
safety issues, and drug manufacture safety and efficacy.43
Critics of the expansive scope of public health have claimed that government
regulation in the name of public health overreaches by delving into areas that are
inherently political and commercial, and in addition, that government lacks the
expertise and training to sufficiently keep up-to-date with diverse public health
initiatives." Policies based on such an argument are misconceived within the
context of off-label promotion; without an appropriate check on the promotional
efforts that encourage off-label use, questionable exchanges between drug
companies and physicians will persist at the expense of the public's health.45
Notwithstanding off-label prescribing as legal and recurrent in some medical
situations, the practice itself is dangerous because it is often issued to patients
without the off-label use having undergone any comprehensive evaluation of data
showing evidence of either its benefits or risks for the attempted treatment of a
medical problem.46 The present challenge for ensuring the health and quality of life
of Americans who use medication off-label is clear. A collaborative system is
needed to influence drug efficacy standards and transparency so as to ultimately
promote delivery of the best therapeutic benefit to the public and not encourage
risky and ineffective medical treatments.47
43. BERNARD J. TURNOCK, PUBLIC HEALTH: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 18-19 (4th ed.
2009).
44. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: A Defense of the "Old"
Public Health, 46 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY & MED. S 138 (2003) (arguing that the modem view of
what encompasses a public health issue ought to be narrowly applied rather than broadly utilized), with
Lawrence 0. Gostin & M. Gregg Bloche, The Politics of Public Health: A Response to Epstein, 46
PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY & MED. S160 (2003) (critiquing the claim that modem public health
overreaches in its application to "new" social circumstances).
45. See Eric G. Campbell, Doctors and Drug Companies-Scrutinizing Influential Relationships,
357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1796, 1796 (2007) (noting various instances where physician-industry
relationships can have negative consequences within the health care system); Robert M. Sade,
Dangerous Liaisons? Industry Relations with Health Professionals, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 398, 399
(2009) (reporting that sponsored continuing medical education programs by drug companies can be
"associated with increased prescribing of the particular companies' products").
46. Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use-Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008). An assertion of off-label use signifies that FDA scientists have
not yet approved an efficacy claim of a drug by the scientific standards promulgated by the "New Drug
Application" filing requirements. Id. For a description of what an FDA-approved drug application
requires and when it can refuse or withdraw an approved application, see 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (d)-(e)
(2006) (providing a non-exclusive list of reasons for FDA to reject a drug approval application); Edison
Pharm. Co. v. FDA, 600 F. 2d 831, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (explaining the value and need for a showing
of "substantial evidence" that a drug is objectively effective for its intended medical use).
47. Dresser & Frader, supra note 3, at 483-84.
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B. FDA's Regulatory Authority in the Context of Off-Label Promotion
Pharmaceutical regulation in the United States over off-label promotion
practices 48 between the industry and physicians is of topical debate. Since
enactment of the FDCA in 1938, the FDA has had the authority to monitor and
scrutinize the promotional materials of pharmaceutical companies, including print
and Internet advertisements, broadcast announcements, and materials produced for
dissemination to health care practitioners and patients, and used by pharmaceutical
sales representatives. 49 The purpose of FDA oversight is to establish a process for
ensuring that promotional materials are being communicated in a manner that is
truthful in its representation of a product, not misleading, and substantiated by
evidence from clinical trials or clinical experience. 50 The FDA implements their
regulatory authority by reviewing various forms of promotional materials, issuing
warning letters 5' and injunctions against pharmaceutical manufacturers, and in
some circumstances, forwarding cases of off-label promotion for criminal
investigation.
5 2
Although the FDCA does not explicitly prohibit the promotion of off-label
uses, two federal provisions effectively provide the FDA with authority to oversee
manufacturers' product marketing.53 By utilizing the FDCA's labeling and
misbranding provisions, the FDA uses its regulatory power to limit a
manufacturers' freedom to advertise products for off-label uses. 4 Notwithstanding
FDCA's regulatory constraints on off-label promotion, pharmaceutical companies
are allowed to reply to unsolicited inquiries from health care practitioners and other
persons in general about unapproved uses.55 While on the one hand, doctors are
permitted to prescribe an FDA-approved drug for any use,56 they generally do not
48. Id.
49. T. Abrams, The Regulation of Prescription Drug Promotion, in ETHICS AND THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 153, 154 (M.A. Santoro & T.M. Gorrie eds., 2005).
50. Michelle M. Mello et al., Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of
Pharmaceuticals, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1558 (2009).
51. See, e.g., Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Orders 2 Companies to Stop Marketing
Unapproved Nitroglycerin Tablets (Mar. 16, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm204744.htm (noting that FDA has issued two warning letters to
Glenmark Generics and Konek Inc. instructing them to stop promoting Nitroglycerin tablets for off-label
uses). For a discussion of emerging issues in FDA regulation, see Jeffrey M. Senger, Emerging Issues in
FDA Regulation: Warning Letters, Internet Promotion, and Tobacco, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y
211 (2010).
52. Abrams, supra note 49, at 154.
53. S.D. Danzis, Off-Label Communications and Prescription Drugs, in ETHICS AND THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 184, 188.
54. Dresser & Frader, supra note 3, at 477.
55. Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Policy on Promotion of
Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs and Devices; Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,823
(1994).
56. Largent et al., supra note 21, at 1745.
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disclose to patients that the drugs they are prescribing have sometimes been
marketed to them by pharmaceutical salespeople, 57 and even by doctors employed
by pharmaceutical companies to promote off-label uses to other doctors, 58 for uses
that have not met safety and efficacy requirements set forth by the FDA. This
tension between health care practitioners, the pharmaceutical industry, and FDA's
authority in regulating the marketing of and the dissemination of off-label
information has created some difficulty in monitoring off-label promotion in a
standardized way, leaving off-label promotional products and activities today
largely disorganized and unchecked.59
1. FDA's Prohibition Against Off-Label Promotion: Labels and Misbranding
FDA uses two provisions to oversee manufacturer's product marketing
efforts. First, the FDCA makes it unlawful for a manufacturer to introduce a drug
into interstate commerce with the intent that it be marketed for an off-label
function,60 permitting a drug to enter interstate commerce only when the drug and
its label has received FDA approval. 61 FDA regulation states that "a new drug may
not be approved for marketing unless it has been shown to be safe and effective for
its intended use(s). '62 Because FDA approval is contingent upon a product's
intended use(s), the required labeling that accompanies the product must precisely
reflect its approved use(s).63 As a result, if the manufacturer of the drug is found to
have included information about off-label uses in its labeling information, thus
failing to provide what the FDA deems as "adequate directions for its approved
57. Doctors Should Disclose Off-Label Prescribing to Their Patients, Experts Argue, Sci. DAILY,
Nov. 11, 2008, available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/11/081110223328.htm.
58. See, e.g., David Evans, Big Pharma's Crime Spree, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, Dec. 2009, at 76-
78 (reporting that when Dr. David Franklin worked as a medical liaison for Warner-Lambert Co. before
Pfizer Inc. had purchased the company in 2000, which was previously owned by Parke-Davis, Inc., his
manager encouraged him, along with other doctors, to utilize his doctorate as a badge in order to induce
physicians to prescribe Neurontin for off-label use, to children in some cases, even if it meant
withholding reported harmful side-effects to the physicians, thus undermining patients' general welfare).
59. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., PUB. No. GAO-08-835, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA's
OVERSIGHT OF THE PROMOTION OF DRUGS FOR OFF-LABEL USES 5, 31 (2008).
60. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(6) (2009).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
62. 21 C.F.R. § 310.303(a). The FDCA explicitly states that new pharmaceutical drugs cannot be
distributed in interstate commerce unless the proprietor of the drug illustrates to the FDA that the drug is
safe and effective for each of its intended medical uses. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (d).
63. A drug's package, along with any inserts, constitutes "labeling." 21 U.S.C. § 321(k), (m). The
FDA has also considered various forms of promotional printed materials related to a drug to fall under
"labeling." 21 C.F.R. § 202.1; see also Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55
(D.D.C. 1998) (finding that not only are package inserts that accompany a drug "labels" but also "nearly
every form of drug company promotional activity, including booklets, pamphlets, mailing pieces,
bulletins, and all literature that supplements, explains, or is otherwise textually related to the product"
amounts to labeling); United States v. Vitamin Indus., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 755, 765-66 (D. Neb. 1955)
(posters on display that contained a description about a use of a drug shipped separately from the drug
were found to fall under FDA's "labeling" regulations).
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use(s)," 64 the manufacturer will have violated the FDCA, ensuing then in the
mislabeling of the drug's original FDA-approved label. The second provision bans
manufacturers from introducing into interstate commerce a "misbranded" drug.6 5 A
drug is deemed to be misbranded if its label contains misleading information,
incorporates information about unapproved uses, or fails to include information that
supplements the safe use of the FDA-approved applications.66 In addition to these
two federal provisions, FDA also has the authority to seize misbranded drugs that
have been introduced into interstate commerce 67 enjoin companies who unlawfully
promote drugs, 68 and in some instances, it also has the capacity to seek criminal
penalties for off-label marketing.69
2. An Expansion to FDA's Scope of Off-Label Restrictions: The Food & Drug
Administration Modernization Act
In the mid-1990's, major effort by lobbyists for the pharmaceutical industry
sought to soften FDA's restrictions against off-label promotion.7 ° In 1997, several
amendments to the FDCA were passed by Congress granting authority to the FDA
to regulate the distribution of information by pharmaceutical manufacturers to
health care providers concerning FDA-approved and off-label uses.71 Codified in
section 401 of the Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA),
manufacturers were permitted to disseminate information in relation to an off-label
use, as long as the manufacturer abided by specified requirements:
(1) Submission of a new drug application for the proposed new use;
64. See FDA Guidance Document: Decision in Washington Legal Found. v. Hanney, 65 Fed. Reg.
14,286, 14,286 (Mar. 16, 2000); but see Mark E. Boulding, The Statutory Basis for FDA Regulation of
Scientific and Educational Information, 4 J. PHARM. & L. 123, 138-39 (1995) (arguing that the FDA's
definition of "intended use" is too comprehensive).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 331. For an illustration of how the FDCA's misbranding doctrine operates, see
Nature Food Centres, Inc. v. United States, 310 F.2d 67 (1st Cir. 1962). Nature Food Centres, Inc. was
found to have misbranded Hemo-Glo. The company had promoted its FDA approved use for a "dietary
supplement," but it had also promoted the drug as having the ability to restore gray hair to its natural
color. Id. at 70. Because the drug's label only consisted of the FDA-approved dietary supplement use,
the court sided with the government and held that Nature Food Centers, Inc. misbranded Hemo-Glo due
to its failure to abide by FDA's labeling requirements. Id. at 71.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 331(k). Any visual material that is distributed by a manufacturer that explains the
uses of a drug can be considered as part of the drug's labeling, even if the article of information is not
included within the drug's packaging. See, e.g., Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 347-48 (1948)
(finding a separate literature publication pertaining to a drug's suggested usage as constituting a
supplement to the label of the product's packaging).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a).
68. Id. § 332(a).
69. Id. § 333.
70. James O'Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer Liability
for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANN. HEALTH L. 295,297 (2003).
71. Food & Drug Admin. Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301-399).
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(2) Distribution of information must not be abridged, false, misleading,
or posing significant health risks to the public;
(3) All clinical research cited to in the disseminated materials must be
the work of the manufacturer;
(4) Mandatory submission to the FDA of a copy of the materials to be
distributed sixty days prior to dissemination; and
(5) Complete disclosure in all disseminated materials to recipients that
the materials pertain to an unapproved use of the drug.72
FDAMA also required drug manufacturers to keep records, and to report to FDA as
needed, regarding an off-label's medical impact subsequent to the dissemination of
material of an unapproved use. If the manufacturer failed to comply with these
requirements, the FDA could then have issued an order terminating the distribution
of informational materials until sufficient corrective action was taken."
Under FDAMA's section 401, manufacturers were given the opportunity to
advertise off-label uses of their products as long as they adhered to the requisite
conditions prior to disseminating off-label informational materials to healthcare
practitioners.74 By adhering to these requirements, section 401 provided
pharmaceutical companies a safe harbor protection from FDCA misbranding
violations.7 5 However, if an allegation was made that a manufacturer had engaged
72. Id.
73. FDA Proposes Rules for Dissemination Information of Off-Label Uses, HHS NEws, June 5,
1998, available at http://www.scienceblog.com/community/older/archives/M/2/fdal 150.htm.
74. This 1997 amendment to the FDCA, mandating manufacturers to abide by several requirements
when distributing promotional materials on off-label uses, prompted litigation relating to manufacturers'
promotional statements about their products as qualifying as commercial speech, and thus, protected
from mandatory constraints under the First Amendment. In the late 1990s, a federal court held that the
provisions in section 401 of FDAMA were more restrictive than necessary to advance FDA's interest in
establishing grounds for manufacturers to obtain FDA approval for off-label uses. Washington Legal
Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 86-89 (D.D.C. 1999); Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13
F. Supp. 2d 51, 72-74 (D.D.C. 1998). The court reasoned that some of the mandatory provisions on
promotion unnecessarily curtailed manufacturers' constitutionally protected commercial speech rights.
Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 86-89. The court then ruled that FDA could mandate manufacturers to
disclose their financial interests and that the promoted use has not yet been approved by the FDA,
however, FDA could not require manufacturers to submit for approval the promoted off-label uses or
require submittal to the FDA of the materials on off-label uses for review. Id. at 87, 89. The government
appealed this ruling, but during the appellate argument, the contested section 401 provisions were
described as simply a "safe harbor" for manufacturers' conduct rather than regulatory requirements, and
subsequently, the case was dismissed. Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 335 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
75. Richard Cooper, The WLF Case Thus Far: Not with a Bang, But a Whimper, 55 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 477, 480-84 (2000) (discussing Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman's appeal and its subsequent
holding in relation to FDAMA's enforcement provisions against a manufacturer's dissemination of
information about off-label uses of their products). Under FDA's interpretation of the safe harbor
provision, if a manufacturer fulfilled FDAMA's section 401 statutory requirements, the FDA would
deem the off-label promotional practices to be in compliance with government oversight, and thus, the
drug or medical device manufacturer would be protected from prosecution. FDA Guidance Document:
Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,286, 14,287 (Mar. 16, 2000).
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in off-label promotional practices and the safe harbor provisions were not met, then
a violation of the statute would have occurred,76 leaving FDA free to exercise
misbranding charges against the manufacturer.77 The passage of section 401 of
FDAMA serves as an illustration of the efforts FDA made to compel all incoming
claims of drug effectiveness to undergo assessments by clinical data results and
regulatory review prior to the promotion, whether oral or written, being made to
prescribing physicians. Members of the American Medical Association have
remarked that section 401 was a "meticulously crafted, bipartisan provision [that
established] both a suitable mechanism and pertinent safeguards that assure[d] the
information manufacturers disseminate[d was] both appropriate and credible."
78
Although section 401 functioned as a voluntary government provision, it provided
a compromise to the pharmaceutical industry to engage in off-label promotional
efforts but in a fixed manner that not only established safety and efficacy standards
for new uses of FDA approved products but also hastened the development and
accessibility of new medical treatments, for the benefit of the public health.79
3. Post-Section 401 of FDAMA: Where Are We Now?
On September 30, 2006, section 401 of FDAMA and its safe-harbor provision
expired.8 0 Serious criticism has surfaced,8 1 relaying similar concerns proponents of
the 1997 amendments to the FDCA once made twelve years ago. 2 Where only a
short time ago section 401 of FDAMA provided a means to oversee the circulation
of reputable promotional materials about off-label uses in order to "ultimately
enhance the public's health and safety" through FDA's "opportunity to review,
comment on, and approve articles" that were being circulated,8 3 the newly
published guidance seeks to serve as a substitute for the expired section 401
provision, 4 but its impact, so far, has not met approval. Although the current law
76. Cooper, supra note 75 at 488; FDA Guidance Document: Decision in Washington Legal
Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. at 14,286-87.
77. Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 128 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2000).
78. Stephanie Stapleton, AMA: Science Must Be Key in Off-Label Drug Information (Aug. 18,
1997), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/1 997/pick_97/pick08I8.htm.
79. O'Reilly & Dalal, supra note 70, at 302-05.
80. After Section 401 ceased to be in effect in 2006, two years passed before FDA released a draft
guidance over the distribution of journal articles promoting off-label uses. See Notice of Availability, 73
Fed. Reg. 9342 (Feb. 20, 2008). The final guidance was published on January 13, 2009. FDA GOOD
REPRINT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 1-2.
81. See infra Part IlI.A.2.
82. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy, during the floor debate over the 1997 proposed
additions to the FDCA, stated that "companies are circulating articles without reviewing them for off-
label uses, without seeking review or approval by the FDA, and without conducting the studies which
would lead to an ultimate FDA approval or disapproval of the drug['s use]." 143 CONG. REC. 19,836,
19,844 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
83. 143 CONG. REc. at 19,843-44.
84. FDA GOOD REPRINT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 1-2.
2010]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
precludes any promotion of a drug for unapproved uses, 85 drug companies have
widely distributed promotional articles for years and have been met with little to no
consequence.86
The controversy over the integrity and balance of off-label promotional
practices, currently through the popular form of scientific, doctor-reviewed, journal
reprints, has recently sparked further debate. Several cases have emerged in which
pharmaceutical companies paid physicians to compose articles about the
company's products in a favorable way, adding credence to the argument that drug
companies may be focusing on promoting off-label uses rather than engaging in a
peer-review process that objectively discusses a product's scientific effects.8 7
Additionally, other recent instances have revealed that drug companies had
sponsored unacknowledged authors to write promotional journal articles but
attributed authorship to academics who had minutely contributed to the research
and composition. 88 It is undeniable that the current behind-the-scenes focus by drug
companies to manipulate physicians in prescribing drugs for off-label use must be
curtailed. Full disclosure of conflicts of interest between drug companies and
physicians may not be enough to assure a product's safety and efficacy. What is
greatly needed is an evidence-based efficient regulatory review process that would
aim at encouraging new medical treatments but in a manner that portrays a
product's true therapeutic capability.
C. FDA's Other Efforts to Crack Down: Recent Developments in Off-Label
Promotion
In addition to having the ability to charge drug companies for violations of the
misbranding provisions within the FDCA, federal prosecutors also have available
85. Psaty & Ray, supra note 25, at 1949.
86. Scott Gottlieb, From FDA, A Good Frameworkfor Distributing Information on Off-Label Uses,
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG, Apr. 23, 2008, http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2008/04/23/from-fda-a-good-
framework-for-distributing-information-on-off-label-uses/ (arguing that the new guidance provides a
good framework for the drug industry but that any further restrictions over the distribution of
promotional material for off-label uses could hamper the development of medical products).
87. Joseph S. Ross et al., Guest Authorship and Ghostwriting in Publications Related to Rofecoxib:
A Case Study of Industry Documents from Rofecoxib Litigation, 299 JAMA 1800, 1806-10 (2008)
(reporting that several industry-sponsored publications related to rofecoxib were authored independently
by Merck & Co., Inc. before attributing authorship to medically affiliated practitioners or academics);
see also Angela Spelsberg et al., Is Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of Interest in Medicine and Public
Health Sufficient to Increase Transparency and Decrease Corruption?, 63 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY CMTY.
HEALTH 603, 603-04 (2009) (suggesting the need and importance of disclosing conflicts of interest
within the medical community and public health arena so as to increase transparency and legitimacy of
commercially driven clinical research and studies); Ben Hirschler et al., Merck Vioxx Study Was for
Marketing: Researchers, REUTERS, Aug. 19, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSLJ36290220080819 (noting that a 1999 clinical study of Vioxx was really tailored to encourage
prescribing and not therapeutic applications or risks).
88. DeAngelis & Fontanarosa, supra note 10, at 1833 (reporting on two instances of explicit
manipulation of clinical research articles and clinical reviews by industry-sponsored physician authors).
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to them two other federal statutes to impugn both criminal and civil violations
against manufacturers who promote off-label uses of their products: (1) the False
Claims Act,8 9 and (2) the Anti-Kickback statute.9° Although doctors prescribe drugs
for off-label medical treatment, drug companies can be held liable for off-label
promotional activities if the promotional efforts induced health care practitioners to
claim reimbursements for uses that Medicare and Medicaid do not provide
coverage. 91 The combination of doctors who regularly prescribe off-label92 with the
risky business tactics some pharmaceutical companies engage in is significant, and
by partaking in the practice of off-label promotion without some form of review,
the existing hole in the regulatory system may very well lead to patients receiving
ineffective treatments, or in some circumstances, adverse affects.
93
1. Warner-Lambert Co. 's Off-Label Promotion of Neurontin
Seemingly, the bottom line for the pharmaceutical industry's off-label
promotion practices may just be all about money. In January 2004, the health care
fraud unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office discovered that Warner-Lambert Co., a
subsidiary unit of Pfizer, Inc. at that time, had engaged in a scheme to encourage
physicians to prescribe Neurontin, a drug approved for treatment of epilepsy only,
for a medical condition the FDA had never approved it for.94 Pfizer reported $2.27
billion in revenue from sales of Neurontin in 2002, and ninety-four percent of that
profit, $2.12 billion,95 according to the prosecutors' 2004 Pfizer sentencing
memorandum, was traced to off-label prescription use.96
89. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730 (2006).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2006).
91. See, e.g., Stephanie Greene, False Claim Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of
Pharmaceutical Products, 110 PENN ST. L. R. 41, 53-68 (2005) (evaluating the legal implications the
False Claims Act and the Anti-Kickback statute can attribute against a drug company who engages in
off-label promotion practices); Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in
the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 102-23
(2008) (noting the impact of the Neurontin litigation as an illustration of persistent off-label marketing
and prescribing versus the need for objective clinical research and honest dissemination of new
therapeutic uses).
92. David M. Fritch, Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient? Why the FDA Needs to Seek
More, Rather Than Less, Speech from Drug Manufacturers on Off-Label Drug Treatments, 9 MICH. ST.
U. J. MED. & L. 315, 356 n.219 (2005) ("One estimate indicated off-label use accounted for 40-50% of
the $216 billion spent on U.S. prescription drugs in 2003."); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Off-Label
Prescribing, http://www.thedoctorwillseeyounow.com/content/bioethics/art1971.html (last visited June
20, 2010) ("[E]stimates [of off-label prescriptions] run as high as 60% of all drug prescriptions written
in the United States in a given year ... ").
93. See Dresser & Frader, supra note 3, at 482 (arguing that the failure to include children,
pregnant women, and older people in clinical studies could deprive this class of the patient population
from beneficial off-label therapies).
94. Evans, supra note 58, at 73.
95. Id. at 76.
96. Sentencing Memorandum of the United States, United States v. Warner-Lambert Company
LLC, Criminal No. 04-10150 RGS (Mass. Dist. Ct., filed June 2, 2004), at 10-15.
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After much negotiation, Warner-Lambert Co. pleaded guilty to two felony
counts for violating the FDCA in connection with its misbranding of Neurontin
when it failed to supply satisfactory directions for suggested usage and for
introducing an unapproved drug into interstate commerce. 97 Pfizer arranged to pay
$430 million in criminal fines and civil health care liability penalties for Warner-
Lambert Co., and in addition, agreed to abide by the terms of a corporate
compliance program, which in essence, mandated Pfizer not only to make changes
to Warner-Lambert Co.'s aggressive marketing tactics but also provide operative
training and supervision to its marketing and sales staff in order to "ensure[] that
any future off-label marketing conduct is detected and corrected on a timely
basis."98 The compliance program proved to be short-lived. Despite this, the
Neurontin case established legal importance because the False Claims Act
broadened the federal government's efforts in prohibiting off-label promotion by
providing private individuals the ability to initiate legal actions, leaving
pharmaceutical manufacturers to answer to financial exposure and negative
publicity. 99
2. Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc. 's Off-Label Promotion of Bextra
On September 2, 2009, another Pfizer subsidiary, Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc.,
pled guilty to one felony violation of the FDCA for instituting an illegal scheme to
promote Bextra for off-label use. 00 In this instance, Pfizer marketing executives
directed more than 100 sales representatives to promote Bextra for various acute
pain conditions and dosages that it had not been approved for in 2005.101 Several
studies in 2005 revealed that the use of Bextra showed an increase of
cardiovascular risk in specific types of medical treatment for which Pfizer
executives had promoted the drug, and as a result, FDA refused to approve those
Bextra uses on account of safety concerns.
0 2
97. See id. at 4-5 (evaluating what constitutes a misbranding violation). The FDCA prohibits the
introduction of any misbranded drug into interstate commerce. 21 U.S.C. § 33 1(a) (2006).
98. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal &
Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04-civ_322.htm.
99. Mello et al., supra note 50, at 1561-63.
100. Statement of Assistant Attorney General Tony West Before the Senate Judiciary Committee
Entitled "Effective Strategies for Preventing Health Care Fraud" (Oct. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dagltestimony/2009/dag-testimony-091028.html [hereinafter Statement of
Assistant Attorney General].
101. Evans, supra note 58, at 74. Bextra was a drug approved by the FDA only for the relief of
arthritis and menstrual discomfort. Id. The FDA found Bextra to be so hazardous that Pfizer, Inc. took it
off the market for all uses in 2005. Id. Therefore, the time period in which these Pfizer executives were
active in pushing for off-label Bextra sales was approximately the same time when Pfizer, Inc. was
resolving the criminal and civil liability allegations for illegally promoting Neurontin in 2004. Id.
102. Statement of Assistant Attorney General, supra note 100.
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Pfizer was walloped with $2.3 billion in fines and penalties. 103 Despite being
the largest health care fraud settlement to date by the Department of Justice,' °4 the
$2.3 billion in fines amounted to a mere 14% of Pfizer's $16.8 billion in Bextra
sales revenue from 2001 to 2008.1'5 In addition to these fines and penalties,
Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc. was also directed to pay a criminal fine of $1.195 billion
and a criminal forfeiture of $150 million, a total of $1.3 billion in criminal fines,
the largest criminal fines ever mandated in the United States.'0 6 Regardless of this
record-breaking health care fraud enforcement effort, Pfizer has paid a total of
$2.75 billion in off-label penalties since 2004, but in crunching the numbers, this
amounts to only 1.12% of the pharmaceutical giant's $245 billion proceeds from
2004 to 2008.1'
There is no question as to whether there will be more such settlements; the
significance here is when such settlements will be publicly announced and how
large the fines and penalties will entail. For example, the first of these types of
settlements for fiscal year 2009 publicly materialized in January 2009 when Eli
Lilly & Co. plead guilty to violating the FDCA in order to settle charges alleging
that the sizeable pharmaceutical company had, for no less than four years, illegally
marketed Zyprexa, a drug the FDA had approved for the treatment of
schizophrenia, for usage of dementia in elderly patients. 0 8 In a multi-site placebo-
controlled trial studying the effects of Zyprexa for the treatment of dementia, out of
the group of patients that were administered Zyprexa, 24%, the largest percentage
compared to the other administered anti-psychotic drugs, had to discontinue their
assigned treatment dosage due to adverse effects: intolerability to the drug,
sedation, dizziness, cerebrovascular instances, extrapyramidal signs, and death.'0 9
3. It's Crunch Time: What Is the Lesson Here?
Due to the increased frequency of U.S. pharmaceutical companies pleading
guilty to criminal charges and paying fines and penalties to resolve civil liabilities
in the last decade for promoting FDA approved drugs for off-label use, often by
deception or inducements to physicians, there is little doubt that pharmaceutical
executives have increased marketing efforts in order to spur sales and create a new
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Evans, supra note 58, at 74.
106. Statement of Assistant Attorney General, supra note 100.
107. Evans, supra note 58, at 74.
108. Id.
109. See Lon S. Schneider et al., Effectiveness of Atypical Antipsychotic Drugs in Patients with
Alzheimer's Disease, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1525, 1536-37 (2006) (concluding that given the large
number of adverse effects of Zyprexa, also known as olanzapine, along with the other anti-psychotic
drugs administered, the recorded efficacy, as a whole, was minimal).
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market, that of off-label use, for existing FDA approved drugs." 0 In promoting off-
label uses for drugs that have neither been tested for efficacy or patient safety, the
practice of promoting drugs for off-label use in such drastically high numbers to the
public is putting millions of individuals at risk to a plethora of adverse and
unknown effects. Any kind of promotion or circulation of information about an
unapproved use of a drug should be conducted on a high academic and scientific
level."' The test should consider whether the manufacturer of the drug product will
monetarily benefit from the increased off-label use of the product as a result of the
circulation of promotional materials. If so, some form of regulation should be
necessary to oversee the content of the promotional materials so as to both protect
and prevent serious harm to the public from use of such enormously active
chemical products.
II. UNITED STATES V. CARONIA: AN EXAMPLE OF A PUBLIC HEALTH FOCUS IN OFF-
LABEL PROMOTION
A New York district court ruling on a motion to dismiss served as a warning
call to pharmaceutical manufacturers over their off-label promotional activities of
products. In United States v. Caronia,"2 the Eastern District of New York
considered whether Alfred Caronia, a sales representative of Orphan Medical, Inc.,
violated the FDCA when he marketed non-FDA approved uses of the drug
Xyrem.113 In light of Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission of New
York,' 4 which articulates a four-part test for determining whether commercial
speech is protected by the First Amendment, the court held that the misbranding
provisions of the FDCA as applied to Caronia's activities in promoting Xyrem for
off-label use were not an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech under
the First Amendment." 5 In denying the pharmaceutical sales representative's
motion to dismiss, the Eastern District of New York made several important
interpretations about the First Amendment and its application to off-label
promotion. 16 In reaching its conclusion, the court held that the FDA's interest in
safeguarding the public health outweighed Caronia's right to freedom of speech
even though (1) the behavior Caronia sought to encourage-physicians prescribing
a drug for off-label uses-is not illegal, and (2) the information Caronia used to
promote off-label uses of Xyrem was neither false nor misleading." 
7
110. Psaty & Ray, supra note 25, at 1950-51.
111. Dresser & Frader, supra note 3, at 483.
112. 576 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
113. Id. at 388-89.
114. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
115. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 393-401.
116. See infra Part ll.B.
117. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 401-02.
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A. The Case
In July 2002, Orphan Medical, Inc., now known as Jazz Pharmaceuticals,"
8
received approval from the FDA to market Xyrem, a powerful sleep-inducing
depressant to treat cataplexy, a condition associated with narcolepsy that causes
one's muscles to stop functioning without notice." 9 After submitting a
Supplemental New Drug Application for Xyrem to the FDA, in November 2005,
the FDA also approved Xyrem to treat narcolepsy patients suffering from excessive
daytime sleepiness. 120 The FDA has only approved Xyrem for these two specific
uses.
121
Narcolepsy is a chronic neurological disorder that affects approximately
140,000 Americans. 122 An estimated sixty to ninety percent of narcolepsy patients
experience cataplexy,12 3 a debilitating symptom of narcolepsy that is usually
triggered by strong emotions such as laughter, anger, or surprise. 24 In the most
severe cases, cataplexy causes one's muscles to tense up and stop functioning all
together at any given moment, prompting a person to collapse during waking
hours. 25 Because the trademark symptom of narcolepsy is excessive and
overpowering daytime sleepiness, even after sleeping at nighttime, narcoleptics are
often prescribed day time stimulants in order to stay awake and nighttime
depressants to help one's body to sleep.
126
The active ingredient in Xyrem is gamma-hydroxybutrate, otherwise known
as GHB, a powerful and fast-acting central nervous system depressant capable of
inducing sleep in a short period of time. 27 Use of Xyrem has been reported to
118. Orphan Medical, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters and principal place of
business located in Minnetonka, Minnesota. Orphan is a specialty pharmaceutical company focused
primarily on the development of drugs to treat pain, sleep disorders, and central nervous system
disorders. Superseding Misdemeanor Information, United States, v. Gleason, Criminal No. 06-229 (S-2)
(ENV) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8. 2008).
119. UCB and Jazz Pharmaceuticals Announce Expansion of Xyrem(R) License Agreement to
Include Fibromyalgia Syndrome, MED. NEWS TODAY, Oct. 4, 2006, available at
http://www.medicalnewstoday.comarticles/53332.php [hereinafter UCB and Jazz Pharmaceuticals
Expansion of Xyrem].
120. Frederick R. Ball et al., How Hard Should It Be to Imprison Someone for Telling the Truth?:
FDA Advertising Regulation Enforcement, UPDATE (Food & Drug L. Inst., Wash., D.C.), Sept./Oct.
2009, at 6, 8, available at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/misc/pressclips/2009FoodDrugLawlnstitute.pdf.
121. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 389.
122. Orphan Medical Announces FDA Approval of Xyrem, PROJECTGHB.ORG, July 17, 2002,
http://www.projectghb.org/orphan-medical.htm.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. UCB and Jazz Pharmaceuticals Expansion of Xyrem, supra note 119; see also Univ. of
Maryland Med. Ctr., Narcolepsy Treatment, http://www.umm.edu/patiented/articles/what-treatments_
narcolepsy-000098_6.htm (last visited June 20, 2010) ("Stimulant drugs are used to manage excessive
daytime sleepiness while antidepressants and other compounds address cataplectic symptoms.").
127. UCB and Jazz Pharmaceuticals Expansion of Xyrem, supra note 119.
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cause a number of potential side effects, such as difficulty breathing while asleep,
confusion, abnormal thinking, depression, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, headache,
bedwetting and sleepwalking. 128 In addition, clinical studies show that abuse of
Xyrem can lead to dependence and severe withdrawal symptoms along with serious
medical problems including seizures, coma, and death. 129 Due to concerns over
Xyrem's serious dangers and potential abuse, FDA required Xyrem's label to
incorporate a "black box" warning, 130 stating that Xyrem's safety and efficacy have
not been ascertained for use by elderly and children patients.'
31
In April 2005, the FDA's Office of Criminal Investigations, Special
Prosecutions Staff, began a criminal investigation of alleged off-label promotion of
Xyrem by Orphan Medical and one of its sales representatives. 13 2 During the
investigation, the government utilized a physician as an undercover witness to
verify if the allegations were true. On October 26, 2005, the government accused
Caronia of advertising to the undercover physician several off-label uses of Xyrem
for patients suffering from fibromyalgia, EDS, and chronic pain and fatigue.' 33 The
government also charged that, on November 2, 2005, Caronia introduced the
undercover physician to an Orphan-paid physician who then subsequently
promoted Xyrem for further off-label uses, including sleepiness, weight loss, and
chronic fatigue.' 
34
The United States government filed a two count misdemeanor charge against
Caronia for allegedly violating the FDCA's misbranding regulations.' 35 Count one
of the misdemeanor charge alleged that between March 2005 and March 2006,
Caronia knowingly and intentionally conspired with others to misbrand a drug
when he marketed Xyrem for off-label uses in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 33 1(a), (k),
333(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 37 1.136 Count two of the misdemeanor charge accused
Caronia of partaking in a substantive violation of misbranding a drug while it was
128. Id.
129. United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
130. Id. A black box warning is a specific type of warning that appears on a prescription drug's
package insert. A black box warning serves as an alert to potential users that a drug carries a significant
risk of harm. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(1) (2009).
131. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 389.
132. United States v. Caronia, Superseding Indictment In 12, 24(e).
133. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 389.
134. Id. at 389-90.
135. Id. at 389. In July 2007, Orphan Medical plead guilty to felony charges pursuant to FDCA's
misbranding provision and paid more than $20 million in fines and penalties. Orphan Medical further
admitted to engaging in a scheme to promote Xyrem for off-label uses through their sales
representatives and physician consultants. On one occasion, for example, an Orphan Medical-paid
psychiatrist advised other physicians on how to "conceal" Xyrem prescriptions from insurance
reimbursement forms. Press Release, Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Agrees to Pay $20 Million to Resolve
Criminal and Civil Allegations in "Off-Label" Marketing Investigation (July 13, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2007/2007jull 3a.html.
136. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 389.
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held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce, violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(k)
and 333(a)(1).' 37
Caronia moved to dismiss the misdemeanor charge on several grounds,
arguing that the misbranding provisions of the FDCA violated his right to free
speech under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.' 38 The Caronia
court promptly rejected Caronia's first two arguments that were presented in
support of his motion to dismiss.1 39 The court then expended significant analysis on
Caronia's First Amendment argument because the constitutional issues being raised
by Caronia "are very much unsettled, not only in this circuit but nationwide. 140
Caronia presented the argument that the government, through its misbranding
provisions of the FDCA cannot restrict truthful, non-misleading promotion by a
pharmaceutical manufacturer to a physician with respect to off-label uses because
such restrictions of commercial speech are unconstitutional. 14' After a careful
analysis of Caronia's First Amendment justification against FDCA's restrictions on
promotion of off-label uses, the court rejected Caronia's argument, deciding that, in
this circumstance, the FDCA's prohibition against encouragement of off-label uses
is an appropriate, and constitutional, government exercise in light of its interest in
protecting public health.
142
B. The Court's Reasoning
In Caronia, the Eastern District of New York denied Caronia's motion to
dismiss charges of misdemeanor violations of the misbranding provisions of the
FDCA and ruled that the case would proceed with jury selection and trial. 143
Writing for the court, Judge Vitaliano held the following: (1) that the information
presented by the government was sufficient to allege violations of the misbranding
provisions of the FDCA, (2) the alleged conduct by Caronia had in fact violated the
FDCA, (3) the alleged promotion of off-label uses of Xyrem to physicians did
constitute commercial speech under the First Amendment, (4) the misbranding
137. Id.
138. Id. at 393.
139. Id. Caronia first argued that the allegations in the indictment, and the supporting facts, actually
illustrate that he did not misbrand Xyrem within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) because he provided
sufficient verbal warning about the drug's side effects to the undercover physician. Id. at 391-92. The
court rejected this argument and stated that it was "utterly without merit" based on the FDCA's
"intended use" regulations. Id. at 392. Second, Caronia argued that he did not misbrand Xyrem in his
conversations with the undercover physician because the physician he promoted off-label uses of Xyrem
to was neither going to be a user or a prescriber of the drug. Id. The court also rejected this argument
because 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) only requires the government to show that a defendant took some kind of
action with respect to the misbranding of a drug. Id. The court further concluded that at the point of a
case's motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations as true. Id. at 393.
140. Id. at 394.
141. Id. at 393.
142. Id. at 401-02.
143. Id. at 403.
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provisions themselves did not violate the First Amendment protection for
commercial speech, and lastly, (5) the misbranding provisions were not overbroad
with regard to the scope and purpose of the FDCA's legitimate existence.' 4 A
summation of the court's analysis follows.
1. Can Caronia's Statements Be Considered as Commercial Speech?
The First Amendment disallows particular kinds of restrictions on freedom of
speech. Nevertheless, not all forms of speech are granted the same level of
protection.1 45 In an attempt to interpret whether Caronia's conduct ought to have
been constitutionally protected under the First Amendment's commercial speech
doctrine, the court first considered whether the information promoting the off-label
usage of Xyrem falls within the category of "speech" rather than that of
"conduct.', 146 Although the government argued that the commercial speech doctrine
is not applicable in this instance because Caronia's acts of promotion only showed
evidence of the intent element needed to establish criminal misbranding, 47 the
court was unconvinced and further added that prior case precedent pointed to an
alternative understanding of when acts constituted conduct and not speech, and vice
versa. 148
The court next examined whether Caronia's alleged promotional acts of
speech amounted to commercial speech. The court explained that their
interpretation of when speech, here the promotional marketing acts by Caronia,
corresponds with speech that can be categorized as falling under the commercial
speech umbrella, would hinge upon an application of Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp.'s three-factor test 49 that established when a promotional activity is
deemed to be protectable within the ambit of commercial speech. 150 Applying the
three factor test established in Bolger, the court then reached the conclusion that
Caronia's statements to the undercover physician ought to be considered
commercial speech because (1) the statements were in effect advertising Xyrem's
potential use, (2) the statements in question is in regard to a specific product,
Xyrem, and (3) the statements made were economically motivated.' 5' Thus, in
applying the Bolger three factor test, the court reasoned that the promotional speech
144. Id. at 392-93, 395, 401-02.
145. Id. at 395-96.
146. Id. at 394-95.
147. Id. at 394 (citing Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 952-53 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding that
the FDA did not violate the First Amendment's prohibitions on commercial speech when it concluded
that a dietary supplement had to be approved as a drug before being marketed as effective)).
148. Id. at 395 (citing Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 1998)
(stating that the FDA cannot consider the promotion of an activity as conduct and not speech)).
149. 463 U.S. 60, 63-68 (1983).
150. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 396.
151. Id.
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by Caronia to the undercover physician on behalf of Xyrem's manufacturer
constitute commercial speech, and as such, should be "entitled to the qualified but
nonetheless substantial protection afforded to commercial speech."'' 52 After
determining that Caronia's statements fall within the domain of commercial speech,
the court then applied the Central Hudson test' 53 to ascertain if Caronia's
statements were protected by the First Amendment.
54
2. Is the FDCA Misbranding Statute Unconstitutional Under Central Hudson?
Having deduced that Caronia's promotional statements in marketing Xyrem
to physicians amount to commercial speech, the Court next assessed whether
Caronia's speech ought to be recognized as protected under the commercial speech
doctrine of the First Amendment. To determine this, the Court applied the four-
prong commercial speech test set forth in Central Hudson. In restating the Central
Hudson test, the court summarized that its analysis must address the following four
issues before reaching a conclusion: (1) whether the off-label speech at issue
concerns lawful activity and is not inherently misleading, (2) whether the
government has a substantial interest in restricting off-label promotion by
manufacturers, (3) whether restricting off-label promotion by manufacturer directly
advances a substantial government interest, and finally, (4) whether the "reasonable
fit" test can be met when considering if FDCA's restriction of promoting off-label
uses are not more extensive than necessary.'55 A synopsis of the court's analysis
follows.
When embarking upon the Central Hudson test, the threshold issue that must
first be addressed is whether Caronia's commercial speech statements constitute
unlawful activity or if they are inherently misleading. 5 6 If Caronia's statements are
determined to have been unlawful or misleading, then they are not afforded
protection by the First Amendment and further application of the Central Hudson
test is not needed.1 5 7 Finding the Washington Legal Foundation cases to be
persuasive, the court concluded that the promotional practices encouraging off-
label uses is not itself unlawful or misleading.158 Because physicians are permitted
to prescribe drugs for off-label uses, the court contended that Caronia's statements
about Xyrem's uses were therefore not illegal.' 59 The court additionally found that
Caronia's statements were not automatically misleading merely "because the use is
152. Id.
153. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
154. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 396-402.
155. Id. at 396-97.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 397-98 (citing United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003);
Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66-67 (D.D.C. 1998)).
159. Id.
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off-label."' 6 Since Caronia's promotional statements were made to a physician
who assumingly was familiar with the FDA drug approval process and because
Caronia did not specifically assert that the uses he was promoting Xyrem for were
FDA approved, the court then held that Caronia's statements to the undercover
physician were not misleading.
161
Under the second prong of the Central Hudson test, the government must be
able to assert a substantial interest behind a regulation. 162 A court, then, must
determine whether the asserted government interest is in fact substantial. 163 Relying
on the Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman 64 holding, the court
emphatically noted that "the government had a substantial interest in promoting the
health and safety of its citizens" and in order to reach that objective, "the
government had a substantial interest in compelling manufacturers to get off-label
treatments on-label.' '165 Although observing that the Supreme Court of the United
States has previously held that paternalistic assumptions concerning the potential
for the public to use truthful, non-misleading commercial information imprudently
is not a justified reason for suppressing commercial information, the Caronia court
still concluded that the government had a significant interest in encouraging
manufacturers to participate in the FDA approval process of off-label uses of
drugs.'
66
After concluding that the government did indeed have a substantial interest in
requiring off-label uses of drugs to be subjected to the FDA drug approval process,
the third prong of the Central Hudson test a court must address is whether the
regulation in question directly advances the government interest. 67 Relying once
again on Friedman and United States v. Caputo,168 the court asserted that "one of
the few mechanisms available to FDA to compel manufacturer behavior is to
constrain their marketing options; i.e. control the labeling, advertising, and
marketing."' 169 Because ultimately the audience of off-label uses of prescription
drugs is now the public at large, the court observed that the impact of such uses has
increased, giving credibility to the importance of labeling and advertising of these
160. Id. at 397.
161. Id. at 397-98 (quoting United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. I1. 2003)
(discussing the sophistication of the audience to whom the off-label uses were advertised)).
162. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
163. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 397-98.
164. 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998).
165. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 398 (citing Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69-71).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 397-98.
168. 288 F. Supp. 2d912 (N.D. I1. 2003).
169. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 398 (citing Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 921; Friedman, 13 F. Supp.
2d at 72).
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products. 7 ° Consequently, the court found that the "FDCA's prohibitions on
commercial speech of the kind charged in the information filed against Caronia
directly advance the government's interest in subjecting off-label uses of a drug
like Xyrem" to the FDA's drug evaluation and approval processes.
71
In considering prong four of the Central Hudson test, the court then evaluated
whether the FDCA's misbranding provisions were not more extensive than
necessary. 72 To determine if the FDCA's misbranding provisions were too
extensive or appropriate, the court looked to several prior cases for reference.
3
Differentiating Friedman and Caputo, the Caronia court noted that Caronia's First
Amendment challenge directly confronts "FDA's ability to proscribe manufacturer
promotion of off-label uses."'17 4 Because FDA's ability to evaluate the effectiveness
of off-label uses is severely frustrated and because the difficulty in identifying a
less burdensome alternative that would advance the government's substantial
interest was present in Caronia's circumstances, the court held that the FDA's
restriction on off-label speech were not more extensive than necessary, and as a
result, the FDCA misbranding provisions satisfied the last element of the Central
Hudson test.1
75
C. Applying the Law and a Public Health Approach: Why the Caronia Court Has
Been Right... So Far
As it currently stands, Caronia could make it more difficult for drug and
device manufacturers to prevail on a First Amendment defense in promotion of off-
label cases, and for good reason. FDCA's misbranding provisions restricting off-
label promotion of drugs are necessary to ensure that new uses for drugs are
evaluated through its drug efficacy process, but participating in FDA's drug
approval process in relation to an off-label use is currently not mandatory.
76
Although drug companies may purport to be only passing truthful, non-misleading
170. See id. (stating that drugs subject to off-label prescriptions are already in interstate commerce,
which limits how the FDA can influence manufacturer behavior).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 399-402.
173. Id. (citing Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 369-73 (2002) (analyzing a
ban on advertising by pharmacies on compounded drugs under the four pronged test of Central
Hudson); Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 919-22 (holding that FDA's prohibitions against promoting non-
FDA-approved uses via its misbranding provisions were not more extensive than necessary under prong
four of Central Hudson); Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 59, 72-74 (discussing whether restrictions in
FDA-issued Guidance Documents pertaining to the distribution of promotional materials and
sponsorship of CMS seminars encouraging off-label uses are more extensive than necessary, thus
rendering them unconstitutional)).
174. Id. at 399 (quoting Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 922).
175. Id. at 401-02.
176. See Ratner & Gura, supra note 20, at 871-72 (discussing the major reasons why drug
developers are less inclined to file with the FDA supplemental approval applications to include off-label
uses on an already FDA-approved label).
2010]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
information to physicians, the safety and efficacy of these off-label uses have not
undergone systematic evaluation.177 And even though some drug companies report
their clinical study results of off-label uses as being favorable for use, recent cases
of manufacturers manipulating the results, by omitting indicia of ill-effects, have
surfaced. 171
And so, even when promotional information is casted to a sophisticated
listener, such as a practicing physician, the information about an off-label use
should at least be considered as being uncertain. 179 Those against FDA's
misbranding provisions restricting off-label promotion who argue that the
government regulations restrict the free flow of commercial information are
correct; but the restriction is not absolute. Drug manufacturers are not being
restricted altogether from engaging in the dissemination of information for research
and development of new uses for its products. Rather, drug companies are being
instructed on how to participate commercially within such a highly regulated, and
potentially dangerous, trade. Rules dictating the proper manner of engaging in the
business of providing drugs is essential to protect the health and safety of the
public, and without these policies, the quality of healthcare could ultimately
plummet.0s
°
The impact of the Caronia decision provides a general understanding of the
constitutional infirmities some argue FDA policy entails. But more importantly, the
court validated the current regulatory scheme in restricting off-label promotion,181
leaving drug and medical device manufacturers to create alternative non-speech
restrictive policies designed to be in compliance with FDA's regulatory interests.1
8 2
Maintaining control over new uses of regulated products is not always dependent
upon assuring the actual truth or falsity of promotion speech. Ultimately, there is a
distinction between commercial speech and scientific-based expression. FDA's role
ought to be evaluating promotional speech impact to safeguard the public health
from preventable risks in the context of off-label uses. 8 3 As the use of a
177. Dresser & Frader, supra note 3, at 477.
178. Psaty & Ray, supra note 25, at 1949-50.
179. See Largent et al., supra note 21 (suggesting several different ways a doctor ought to scrutinize
available clinical evidence before prescribing off-label treatments).
180. See, e.g., Stafford, supra note 46, at 1427-29 (discussing the damaging results off-label use
currently produces).
181. See supra Parts ILA, B.
182. See, e.g., A. Elizabeth Blackwell & James M. Beck, Drug Manufacturers' First Amendment
Right to Advertise and Promote Their Products for Off-Label Use: Avoiding a Pyrrhic Victory, 58 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 439, 440, 454-61 (2003) (evaluating various speech-restrictive policies FDA has
established related to off-label promotion and the tensions that exist between FDA's regulatory duties
and the pharmaceutical industry's claim to commercial free speech in relation to its scientific
information about their products).
183. See Psaty & Ray, supra note 25, at 1949-50 (arguing that FDA's recent guidelines allowing
sponsors of pharmaceutical products to distribute publications about off-label uses lacks procedural
safeguards that keeps the protection of the public health intact).
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prescription drug changes, so too does its safety and efficacy. 84 By permitting drug
manufacturers to advertise off-label uses, either through a physician or to the
general public, the impending harm to the public's health and safety will become a
reality.'
85
Drug manufacturers should be urged, whether by regulation or by instituting a
safe-harbor exception, to submit new drug applications for off-label uses to the
FDA. While the advantages of off-label prescribing consist of earlier accessibility
of life-saving treatments, new generations of medical innovations, and decreased
drug costs in part from side-stepping FDA's expensive and time-consuming
standard approval process, 186 the disadvantages heavily outweigh the gains. The
risks to public health and safety and the current efforts to encourage physicians to
prescribe off-label uses come at a time where drug manufacturers have realized
large profits. By influencing the prescribing habits of physicians, drug
manufacturers will have decreasing incentives for participating in the FDA's drug
approval process. A concern for the Caronia court, it hypothesized that if FDA's
current prohibitions against promotion of off-label uses did not exist, drug
manufacturers would have no incentive from obtaining a drug approval for a certain
use, and then turning around to promote that same drug for off-label uses.187 This is
only one projected problem that could arise but it is one that serves as an example
of how off-label promotion is inextricably connected to commercialism and public
health.
To promote safe and efficacious uses of off-label medication, FDA
policymakers should seek to create prospective policies that could help inform the
development of balanced opinions and procedures that the industry, physicians,
consumers, and government could then use to make judgments about off-label
uses. 1 88 The FDA must design their enforcement policy in a way that would lessen
the drug manufacturer's practices of providing unchecked information to
physicians. Complete restriction of a drug industry's participation in engaging in
commercial speech is not, nor should it ever be, the effect of the government's
regulation of off-label promotion. The aim of government off-label regulations
should encourage transparency and support for the monitoring of off-label use so
184. Dresser & Frader, supra note 3, at 477.
185. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 11, at 1256-96 (discussing various forms of liability drug
companies can face for violating either the FDA's restrictions on the marketing of off-label uses or other
health care fraud laws).
186. Muriel R. Gillick, Controlling Off-Label Medication Use, 150 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 344,
344 (2009).
187. United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
188. See Dresser & Frader, supra note 3, at 483 (proposing various recommendations on how to
oversee off-label promotional activities by engaging FDA policymakers, Congress, and physicians
together to hone-in on improving current inappropriate practices of off-label prescribing).
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that the practice of off-label promotion is actually enhancing public health and
patient care, and not exploiting the use of novel medicines.'
8 9
One provision FDA could consider enacting is a provision that mandates
safety and efficacy clinical research of an off-label use product once that off-label
use has either (1) reached a certain threshold revenue or (2) has surpassed a specific
number of prescriptions issued.' 9 Although at first glance, tracking such statistics
may require additional resources and manpower, this would provide the FDA an
additional way to monitor the most frequently issued off-label uses of drugs while
simultaneously promoting the participation of FDA's drug approval process. This
way, the new beneficial innovations that come with certain off-label uses could be
reinforced through government oversight, creating a collaborative effort between
the government and the medical profession in together striving to provide patients
with the best and safest care. Drug companies should acknowledge that FDA's
restrictions of drug promotional claims are "not intended to restrict the full
exchange of scientific information concerning the drug, including dissemination of
scientific findings in scientific or lay media."'191 FDA's focus is maintaining low
risks to public health and safety, and in order to achieve this, off-label use should
be deemed as a public health concern.' 92 The Caronia court implicitly
acknowledged this application of public health to off-label promotion; so too
should the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry.
Whether the Caronia decision validating the current regulatory scheme in
restricting off-label promotion will continue to stand is uncertain. Subsequent to the
court's motion to dismiss ruling, a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York convicted Alfred Caronia of conspiring to promote the
narcolepsy drug Xyrem for off-label use. 193 Recently, Caronia filed a brief in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and argues that because he did not
communicate anything false about the drug or the manner in which doctors use the
drug when treating medical conditions, he ought to be protected by the First
189. See Jane E. Henney, Safeguarding Patient Welfare: Who's in Charge?, 145 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 305, 306 (2006) (urging physicians and academic institutions to facilitate transparent
communications with the pharmaceutical industry so that industry-sponsored research and publications
maintain objectivity in its main efforts to provide quality patient care and worthwhile drug development
research).
190. CTR. FOR HEALTH & PHARM. LAW & POL'Y, SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, DRUG AND
DEVICE PROMOTION: CHARTING A COURSE FOR POLICY REFORM 15 (2009), available at
http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/HealthTechlP/upload/whitepaper-jan2OO9.pdf.
191. 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(a) (2009).
192. See generally Christopher D. Zalesky, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Balancing Public
Health and Law Enforcement Interests; Moving Beyond Regulation-Through-Litigation, 39 J. HEALTH
L. 235, 243 (2006) (arguing that FDA should have a more expanded role in overseeing pharmaceutical
marketing practices because the consequences of misleading sales practices lead to over-utilization of
medical treatments and adverse effects to patients).
193. David Belian, Defendant Cites First Amendment in Off-Label Promotion Case, DRUG
INDUSTRY DAILY, Apr. 28, 2010.
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Amendment from being prosecuted for imparting truthful statements about a
commercial product.' 94 The appellate court has not yet scheduled a date to hear oral
arguments. 1
95
III. A CRITIQUE OF FDA'S GUIDANCE ON GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES AND
PUBLICATIONS
On January 13, 2009, FDA announced the publication of its final version of
guidance for Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal
Articles or Scientific Reference Publications on off-label uses.196 After section 401
of FDAMA ceased to be effective in September 2006,197 FDA issued this final non-
binding guidance on Good Reprint Practices intending to clarify the policy
governing one aspect of off-label marketing, the agency's current view on the
dissemination of medical and scientific publications on off-label use.' 98 Reaction to
FDA's final guidance has been mixed.199 One significant change, at a minimum,
has sparked strong criticism: that of not requiring drug companies to submit a new
drug application for off-label uses discussed in the disseminated materials. 20 0 This
omission, along with other key implications of the final guidance, will not provide
an adequate medium to address broad public health concerns about off-label
promotion, and further, it could weaken FDA's overall influence in promoting
efficacy and safety practices.2 °'
A. Summary of FDA 's Final Version
The guidance released in January 2009 presents guidelines for drug
companies on how to disseminate scientific and medical publications in a manner
that would not violate the federal ban against promotion of unapproved uses for
drugs and devices. The guidance permits the distribution of peer-reviewed
scientific articles that describe various off-label uses, but this allowance is subject
to several conditions.0 2 A summary of the types of publications FDA will permit
and the method in which the off-label information should be distributed follows.
Under the guidance, a scientific or medical journal publication that is
distributed should meet the following requirements:
194. Amicus Curiae Brief of Washington Legal Found. in Support of Appellant Alfred Caronia and
Reversal, No. 09-5006-CR (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2010), at 5-30.
195. Belian, supra note 193.
196. 74 Fed. Reg. 1694 (Jan. 13, 2009).
197. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa (2006).
198. FDA GOOD REPRINT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 1.
199. See infra Parts II.B, C.
200. See infra Part III.A.2.
201. Psaty & Ray, supra note 25, at 1949.
202. Dresser & Frader, supra note 3, at 482.
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(1) Be published by an organization that has an editorial board that
utilizes experts in the subject of the article under review and who are
independent of the organization to review.., and that has a publicly
state policy, to which the organization adheres, full disclosure of any
conflict of interest or biases for all authors, contributors, or editors
associated with the journal or organization;
(2) Be peer-reviewed and published in accordance with the peer-review
procedures of the organization; and
(3) Not be in the form of a special supplement or publication that has
been funded in whole or in part by one or more of the manufacturers of
the product that is the subject of the article.2 °3
The guidance also clearly provides instances where scientific or medical reference
articles should not be distributed.20 4 The guidance states that these types of journal
articles should not be disseminated if the literature is primarily distributed by a
drug or device manufacturer, is composed, edited, or excerpted specifically for a
drug or device manufacturer, or composed by individuals who have a financial
relationship with the manufacturer. 20 5 The guidance insists that the information
being disseminated must not be false or misleading, inconsistent with credible
evidence, or pose significant risk to the public's health.
Several guidelines providing instruction on the manner in which to
disseminate scientific and medical information is also set forth in the guidance, and
some are provided below:
(1) Be in the form of an unabridged reprint, copy of an article, or
reference publication;
(2) Not be marked, highlighted, summarized, or characterized by the
manufacturer in any way;
(3) Be accompanied by the approved labeling for the drug or medical
device;
(4) Be distributed separately from information that is promotional in
nature .... 206
The guidance also provides a suggested list of affixed statements that should be
accompanied when a journal reprint or reference publication is disseminated, but
the language of the guidance in this section is only suggestive in nature, not
mandated.2 °7
203. FDA GOOD REPRINT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 4-6.
204. For a complete list of the requirements for disseminating scientific or medical publications as
suggested by the FDA, see id. at 3-6.
205. Id. at 4.
206. Id. at 4-5.
207. Id. at 1, 5-6.
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1. Proponents of the FDA's Guidance
In an effort to organize and express support for the recent guidance, a
coalition of ten pharmaceutical companies joined patient advocacy groups to
208further their position. Among the several arguments in favor of the guidance, the
need to preserve the information flow from drug manufacturer to the consumer is of
utmost importance.20 9 According to supporters, by relaxing off-label marketing
restrictions, drug companies will be better equipped to serve the needs of
consumers in an efficient and faster rate than FDA would normally allow them to if
they were absolutely restricted from engaging in off-label promotion.21 ° This way,
as new uses develop for already FDA-approved drugs, drug companies can
continue to issue up-to-date therapeutic options for the benefit of a patient
2 II
without the worry that FDA will automatically respond by filing FDCA
misbranding charges.
Supporters of the guidance also contend that the new guidelines further public
health initiatives. Pharmaceutical Senior Vice-President Ken Johnson reasoned,
"The FDA guidance supports the public health by helping to assure that medical
professionals receive timely and accurate medical information prior to the lengthy
process for inclusion in the FDA-approved labeling., 21 2 Because the guidelines
themselves provide adequate suggestions on how to properly distribute
informational materials to physicians, supporters argue that no further regulation is
needed seeing as they are contributing to the overall development of medical
treatment. Since the guidance does not impose mandatory restrictions on
disseminating publications promoting off-label uses, providing only suggestions,
the drug industry generally endorsed the guidance.
213
2. Opponents of the FDA's Guidance
The guidance has received stem criticism. House Representative Henry
Waxman, one of the leading critics of the guidelines, commented that the
guidelines are a "long-coveted parting gift" for the pharmaceutical industry that
"fundamentally undermines" FDA's authority.2 14 Critics assert that the omission of
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Eschenbach, Comm'r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Sept. 17, 2008) (on file with author) (reiterating
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not requiring companies to submit a new drug approval application for off-label
uses discussed in the disseminated scientific materials, a key requirement that was
in effect under section 401 of FDAMA, effectively undercuts FDA's drug approval
process.215 Pointing to current and potential weaknesses in the integrity of scientific
findings on drugs and devices, critics believe that the guidelines will not create the
needed transparency between drug manufacturers and the promotional materials
they distribute.21 6 The fear that critics currently have over the present form of the
guidance is that the objective research element inherent to a drug's safety and
efficacy is being muddled and manipulated, and therefore, promotional journal
publications ought to be viewed as suspect by the time they reach physicians and
consumers.
2 17
There is no dispute that some off-label uses can be helpful in treating medical
conditions. But what critics to the guidelines emphasize is that the practice of
promoting off-label uses to large groups of consumers can be very dangerous. 2 8
Nearly every drug has side effects, some of them serious. Those risks consumers
take can be worth the potential benefit when they are evaluated and properly
studied. With off-label uses, on the other hand, the risks remain but the benefits are
considerably less certain. 219 Because the guidance lacks any recommendation
encouraging manufacturers to work towards submitting for FDA approval of the
off-label uses endorsed in the promotional reprints, critics contend that
manufacturers will opt not to conduct thorough clinical trials of off-label uses, may
choose to mainly publish auspicious findings, and may perhaps portray study
results in a manner that promotes their products favorably without any checks to
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guidance on promoting off-label uses in medical journal articles).
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the products' safety and efficacy. 220 With safety profiles of off-label uses being
uncertain, off-label promotion to physicians does not ensure that the quality of data
being presented cannot be subject to major manipulation.221
B. How the Guidance Should Be Reworked: The Lesson Here Is Lessen Risk
The potential for abuse by the pharmaceutical industry, given its record, is
high. The public should reasonably be skeptical about the companies' marketing
tactics in encouraging doctors to prescribe for off-label uses.222 The danger to
human safety by the increasing number of off-label prescriptions is real. New York
State health commissioner, Dr. Richard F. Daines, wrote to FDA about his
concerns of possible pharmaceutical industry manipulation of peer-reviewed
journals, and stated, "We just have so many concerns .... You don't know the
publication's true peer-reviewed standards and transparency., 223  Proper
precautionary efforts should be in place to prevent harm to patients and ensure that
measures are taken to show that a medical product is truly effective, safe, and
beneficial to population health. The value of encouraging the pharmaceutical
industry to submit to the FDA an application for drug approval should be
emphasized, helping to legitimize the process and establish accountability and trust
for its disseminated promotional materials.
Ultimately, the focus for public policy here should center on how to
encourage pharmaceutical companies to engage in non-misleading promotional
efforts of their manufactured products. With each case of deceitful off-label
marketing, millions of patients are unknowingly put at risk when physicians have
been discovered to have prescribed medications based on skewed marketing ploys
by drug companies and their employees.224 Although physicians do need to obtain
information about potential new uses of medical products, physicians largely learn
220. CTR. FOR HEALTH & PHARM. LAW & POL'Y, supra note 190, at 14.
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http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroon/PressAnnouncements/2007/ucmlO8994.htm. Recent FDA
advisory panels have systematically reviewed frequent off-label uses and found them to be so lacking in
efficacy or dangerous that either mandatory cessation in the marketing of an unapproved use of a drug
was ordered or stem recommendations were issued to modify a drug's label with the aim of appending
written warnings against the off-label use of a particular product. Id.
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about new uses from pharmaceutical-sponsored sources and these commercial
efforts have been exceedingly effective in influencing many therapeutic
decisions.225 Completely restricting off-label promotional efforts is not the reply
policymakers should retort with since off-label uses of FDA approved products
have and will continue to bring about new therapeutic treatments for patients. But
entering the commercial market with these particular chemically compounded
products should come with a heightened level of oversight by both the government
and by the medical community. The purpose of passing off-label information along
to physicians ought to facilitate ideas and knowledge to serve therapeutic good not
pursue the engagement of the medical community to achieve commercial
distribution of a product.226 What the FDA and the medical community must do is
to take the cue from the Caronia court. The real emphasis of these guidelines
should have been the public's health and since the guidelines provide substantial
leeway for the dissemination of off-label uses without appropriate oversight, the
configuration of the guidance is simply way too broad.
CONCLUSION
In light of the recent holding by the Caronia court, the FDA's current
approach to restricting off-label promotional practices are constitutionally sound.
Moreover, the court correctly emphasized that they are good policies that take into
account FDA's role in managing and protecting the public's health from illness and
industry abuse. 227 However, FDA's prohibitions on off-label promotion, codified
by its recent issuance of the guidance, does very little to encourage drug companies
to participate in the new drug approval process. FDA acknowledges that physicians
legally prescribe drugs for off-label uses to their patients on a regular basis. FDA
also agrees that the use of unapproved treatments of drugs can sometimes be the
standard of care for medical treatment to a particular group of patients.
Nevertheless, restrictions upon manufacturers who distribute what they call
truthful, non-misleading materials that encourage off-label uses, ought to be
implemented given the recent trend by drug companies of dispensing promotional
publications about products that have not been proven to be safe or effective, in
addition to being highly dangerous and dependent-forming when consumed.228 The
free flow and exchange of truthful information is paramount within our society but
in the context of this heavily regulated industry, drug companies are not simply
exchanging ideas and research. When a principal aim is to increase revenue at the
225. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avom, Pharmaceutical Promotion to Physicians and First
Amendment Rights, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1727, 1729 (2008).
226. See id. at 1730-31 (suggesting that more oversight is needed of promotional statements by
pharmaceutical manufacturers because the nature of the products being promoted have substantially
influenced a physician's prescribing practices).
227. See supra Part II.C.
228. See supra Part I.C.
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expense of the public's health, regulation is appropriate to ensure the public's
ability in assessing relevant and safe medical treatment options.
Also of importance, by holding drug companies and their employees
accountable for circulating egregious promotional materials that encourage off-
label uses, not only will the public benefit be enhanced but the medical profession,
too, will be improved by being better informed about what is truly a novel medical
treatment option versus a marketing ploy disguised as scientific based reports.
Although critics argue that FDA's enforcement efforts are repressing useful
medical knowledge, if pharmaceutical companies were urged to participate in
FDA's new drug approval process, by way of an updated safe-harbor provision,
both FDA and the industry would be working collaboratively towards ensuring the
information about an off-label use is actually reliable and factually complete. As it
currently stands, and what the Caronia court stressed in its holding, the disarray
that exists between a manipulated piece of literature and a scientifically grounded
article justifies FDA's authority in limiting access to information related to off-
label uses. The focus here is not absolute restriction, rather, it is the need to ensure
whether the value being promoted to the public about an off-label use is precisely
what it entails, and not merely what it seems.
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